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Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania
123 S. Ct. 732 (2003)
I. Facts
On April 12, 1987, David Allen Sattazahn ("Sattazahn") and his accomplice
hid in a wooded area with a pistol and a revolver, respectively, waiting to rob the
manager of Heidelberg Family Restaurant, Richard Boyer ("Boyer"). When
Boyer exited, Sattazahn and his accomplice accosted him and, with guns drawn,
demanded the bank deposit bag. Boyer threw the bag toward the restaurant and
ran away. Sattazahn and his accomplice fired shots and killed Boyer. The men
grabbed the bag and fled.'
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania prosecuted Sattazahn and sought
a sentence of death. On May 10, 1991, a jury convicted Sattazahn of first-,
second-, and third-degree murder along with other charges. The proceeding then
moved to the penalty phase. The Commonwealth presented evidence of one
statutory aggravating factor: commission of the murder during the perpetration
of a felony. Sattazahn presented two mitigating factors: his lack of a significant
history of criminal convictions and his age at the time of the crime.2
In Pennsylvania, the law provides that in the penalty phase of capital
proceedings " 'the verdict must be a sentence of death if the jury unanimously
finds at least one aggravating circumstance ... and no mitigating circumstance
or if the jury unanimously finds one or more aggravating circumstances which
outweigh any mitigating circumstances' "; in all other cases, a sentence of life is
required.3 Title 42, Section 9711 of the Pennsylvania Code also provides that the
court may discharge the jury if the verdict reached was not unanimous, in which
case the court must enter a sentence of life imprisonment.4
1. Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 123 S. Ct. 732, 735 (2003).
2. Id. at 735; see also 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711 (a)(1) (West Supp. 2002) (stating that
"[a]fter a verdict of murder of the first degree is recorded and before the jury is discharged, the
court shall conduct a separate sentencing hearing in which the jury shall determine whether the
defendant shall be sentenced to death or life imprisonment"); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 5
9711(d)(6) (West Supp. 2002) (defining "a killing while in the perpetration of a felony" as an
aggravating factor); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711 (e)(1) (West Supp. 2002) (stating that defen-
dant's lack of a criminal history is a mitigating factor); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 5 9711 (e)(4) (West
Supp. 2002) (stating that the age of the defendant at the time of the crime is a mitigating factor);
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711 (a)-(c) (West Supp. 2002) (providing sentencing procedures for
first degree murder and describing instructions to jury).
3. SattaZaha, 123 S. Ct. at 736 (quoting 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(c)(1)(iv) (West
Supp. 2000)).
4. Id. (citing 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(c)(1)(v) (West Supp. 2000)).
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The jury deliberated for three-and-one-half hours and stated that it was
deadlocked at nine to three for life imprisonment.5 Sattazahn moved the court
to discharge the jury and enter a sentence of life imprisonment.6 The trial court
discharged the jury and entered a sentence of life.7 Sattazahn appealed his
conviction to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania on the ground that the trial
judge erroneously instructed the jury that finding beyond a reasonable doubt that
Sattazahn was armed with a firearm he was not licensed to carry was evidence of
his intention to commit crimes of violence.8 Concluding that the instructions
presented to the jury "relieve[d] the Commonwealth from its burden of proving
by evidence that [Sattazahnj acted with intent to commit the crimes of murder,
robbery, and aggravated assault," the court reversed the conviction and ordered
a new trial.9 On remand, the Commonwealth filed a notice of intent to seek the
death penalty and alleged another aggravating factor in addition to the factor
presented at the first trial.10 Sattazahn moved to prevent the Commonwealth
from seeking the death penalty and from presenting the second aggravating
factor.' The trial court denied the motion, the Superior Court affirmed the
decision, and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania declined to review the ruling.'
2
At the second trial, the jury convicted Sattazahn of first-degree murder and
imposed a sentence of death. 3
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the verdict and the sentence
of death on direct appeal. The court concluded that neither the DoubleJeopardy
Clause of the Fifth Amendment nor the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment barred the Commonwealth from seeking the death penalty at
Sattazahn's second trial. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. 4
II. Holding
Justice Scalia's plurality opinion with Justice O'Connor's concurrence
decided that double jeopardy did not bar the Commonwealth from seeking the
5. Id.
6. Id.; see § 9711 (c)(1)(v) (stating that "the court may, in its discretion, discharge the jury if
it is of the opinion that further deliberation will not result in a unanimous agreement as to the
sentence" and that the court shall sentence the defendant to life).
7. Sattazabn, 123 S. Ct. at 736; see § 9711(c)(1)(v).
8. Commonwealth v. Sattazahn, 631 A.2d 597, 604 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (per curiam).
9. Id. at 606 (concluding that a jury instruction, stating that finding the defendant carried
a firearm without a license was evidence of an intent to commit crimes, was improper and that such
error was not harmless).
10. Sattaqahn, 123 S. Ct. at 736. The Commonwealth alleged a second aggravating fac-
tor-Sattazahn's "significant history of felony convictions involving the use or threat of violence




14. Id.; see Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 535 U.S. 926 (2002) (mem.).
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death penalty at the second trial.'" The Court determined that the jury in
Sattazahn's first trial did not acquit him based on findings sufficient to establish
legal entitlement to a life sentence because the jury deadlocked and did not make
findings on the aggravating or mitigating factors. 6 Rather, double jeopardy will
apply to capital-sentencing proceedings only if a jury unanimously determined
that a State has failed to prove the existence of one or more aggravating factors. 7
III. Anaysis
A. Appying DoubkJeopardy to Capital-Sentendng Proceedings
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment states that "[n]o
person shall.. . be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of
life or limb."' " In Stroud v. United States, 9 the Court held that if a defendant is
convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment in a unitary proceeding,
but successfully appeals that conviction, a death sentence on retrial is not
barred.2" In Bullington v. Missouri,2 the Court held that double jeopardy applies to
capital-sentencing proceedings where such proceedings "have the hallmarks of
the trial on guilt or innocence."' The distinguishing feature between Bulington
and Stroud is "that in Stroud 'there was no separate sentencing proceeding at
which the prosecution was required to prove-beyond a reasonable doubt or
otherwise-additional facts in order to justify the particular sentence.' ,23
In Bulington, the trial in state court resulted in a verdict of guilty of capital
murder and the penalty hearing resulted in a sentence of life imprisonment
without eligibility for probation or parole for fifty years. 24 The Court stated that
the requirement that the prosecution prove "certain statutorily defined facts
beyond a reasonable doubt" in the penalty phase made that phase resemble a
trial.25 This procedure "e.%plidt#y requires the jury to determine whether the prose-
cution has 'proved its case.' ,26 Bull'ngton was thought to hold that if the jury
15. Sattazahn, 123 S. Ct. at 740 (plurality opinion); id. at 743 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
16. Id. at 740 (plurality opinion); id. at 743 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
17. Id. at 740 (plurality opinion).
18. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
19. 251 U.S. 15 (1919).
20. Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15,18 (1919) (holding that jeopardy has not terminated
when a defendant is convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment, but successfully
appeals the conviction). In Stroud, the offense at issue was murder and the sentence that was
imposed by a judge occurred without a separate finding to impose a sentence of death. Sattazahn,
123 S. Ct. at 737 (citing Stroud, 251 U.S. at 18).
21. 451 U.S. 430 (1981).
22. Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 439 (1981).
23. Sattabahn, 123 S. Ct. at 737 (quoting Bulington, 451 U.S. at 439).
24. Bulkngton, 451 U.S. at 435-36.
25. SattaZahn, 123 S. Ct. at 737 (citing Bulington, 451 U.S. at 444).
26. Bul'nfgton, 451 U.S. at 444.
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acquitted the defendant of death by sentencing him to life imprisonment, then
the Double Jeopardy Clause barred a State from seeking death on retrial.27 Later,
in Arizona v. Rumsfy, 25 the Court explained the principle of Bullington further by
requiring that the judgment of an acquittal be "based onfndings suffident to establish
legal entitlement to the fife sentence." 29
Sattazahn argued that because the jury was deadlocked, double jeopardy
should bar Pennsylvania from seeking death at retrial.3" The Court disagreed:
"mhe touchstone for double-jeopardy protection... is whether there has been
an 'acquittal.' ,i' In Sattazabn, the jury made no findings in relation to the alleged
aggravating factor and, therefore, that "non-result" could not be an acquittal
"based on findings sufficient to establish legal entitlement to the life sentence."32
Moreover, because the sentence was "not based on findings which resolve some
factual matter, it is not sufficient to establish legal entitlement to a life sentence.
A default judgment does not trigger a double jeopardy bar to the death penalty
upon retrial. ' 3
B. Appcation in a 'Post-Ring World"
Bullington was decided prior to Ring v. Ariona4 when trials only dealt with
the imposition of a sentence for the "offence" of capital murder. 5 In 2002, the
Court decided in Ring that aggravating factors that make a defendant eligible for
death "operate as 'the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offiense.' ,36
Thus, "the underlying offense of 'murder' is a distinct, lesser included offense of
'murder plus one or more aggravating circumstances.' ,31 The former offense
exposes a defendant to a maximum punishment of life imprisonment and the
latter offense exposes a defendant to a maximum punishment of death. 8
Moreover, the Ring Court held that the Sixth Amendment requires a jury to find
the existence of aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt.39
27. SataZahn, 123 S. Ct. at 737 (quoting BIlington, 451 U.S. at 445).
28. 467 U.S. 203 (1984).
29. Arizonav. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203,211 (1984) (emphasis added) (stating that "[t]he double
jeopardy principle relevant to [Rumsey's] case is the same as that invoked in Bullington").
30. Sattaqahn, 123 S. Ct. at 738.
31. Id.
32. Id. (citing Rumsy, 467 U.S. at 211).
33. Id. at 738-39 (citing Commonwealth v. Sattazahn, 763 A.2d 359, 367 (Pa. 2000)).
34. 122 S. Ct. 2428 (2002).
35. Satatahn, 123 S. Ct. at 739; see Ring v. Arizona, 122 S. Ct. 2428, 2443 (2002) (clarifying
that "[blecause Arizona's enumerated aggravating factors operate as the functional equivalent of
an element of a greater offense, the Sixth Amendment requires that they be found by a jury")
(internal quotations and citations omitted).
36. Sattabahn, 123 S. Ct. at 739 (quoting Ring, 122 S. Ct. at 2443).
37. Id. (quoting Ring, 122 S. Ct at 2443).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 740 (citing Ring, 122 S. Ct. at 2442-43 (clarifying that "[bjecause Arizona's enumer-
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Justice Scalia, writing for a plurality of the Court in SataZahn, stated that in
a "post-Ring world," double jeopardy "can, and must, apply to some capital-
sentencing proceedings consistent with the text of the Fifth Amendment." 4
When a jury unanimously concludes that a State did not prove the existence of
one or more aggravating factors, "double-jeopardy protections attach to that
'acquittal' on the offense of 'murder plus aggravating circumstance(s).' ,41 Thus,
the central issue is not whether a capital-sentencing proceeding is "comparable
to a trial," but "that 'murder plus one or more aggravating circumstances' is a
separate offense from 'murder.' ,42
For double jeopardy purposes, under Pennsylvania law, "first-degree mur-
der" is a lesser-included offense of "first-degree murder plus aggravating circum-
stance(s)."43 In Sattazahn, the jury deliberated without making a decision on
death or life, and did not determine the existence of any aggravating or mitigating
factors.' Because neither the jury nor the judge "acquitted" Sattazahn of death,
the Commonwealth was not barred by double jeopardy from seeking death on
retrial.
4
Sattazahn also alleged a due process claim in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment.4 He argued that the second trial deprived him of his "life" and
"liberty" interests in the life sentence from the first trial because "Pennsylvania
created a constitutionally protected life and liberty interest in the finality of the
life judgment statutorily mandated as a result of a [deadlocked] jury."47 The
Court disagreed and stated that absent from Pennsylvania law is any indication
that "life" or "liberty" interests given in the life sentence after Sattazahn's first
trial were "immutable."4 The Court further held that Sattazahn denied himself
any such interest by appealing the first conviction of murder. 9
ated aggravating factors operate as 'the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense,'
the Sixth Amendment requires that they be found by a jury") (citation omitted)); see U.S. CONsT.
amend. VI (explaining procedural rights in criminal jury trials). The Sattazabn Court decided that
there is no reason why it should distinguish between an offense for the Sixth Amendment's jury-
trial guarantee and the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause. Saftazabn, 123 S. Ct. at 739.
40. Sattazabn, 123 S. Ct. at 740.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. (citing Ring, 122 S. Ct. at 2442-43).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Sattazahn, 123 S. Ct. at 741; see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (stating that "nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law").
47. Satazahn, 123 S. Ct. at 741-42 (alteration in original); see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, 5 1.




IV. Applcation in Virginia
Substantively, Title 42, Section 9711 of the Pennsylvania Code is virtually
identical to Virginia Code Section 19.2-264.4(E). Section 19.2-264.4(F) states
that "[i]n the event the jury cannot agree as to the penalty, the court shall dismiss
the jury, and impose a sentence of imprisonment for life."" ° Therefore, Sattazahn
is applicable directly to Virginia cases in which a life sentence was imposed under
Section 19.2-264.4(E). In those cases, the Commonwealth is not barred from
pursuing a death sentence after a successful appeal of the underlying conviction."
Appeals should be avoided in those cases.
Justice Scalia, writing for three members of the Court, 2 stated that death is
barred on retrial only if the jury makes a determination on the existence of
aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt as well as a determination on the
issue of death. 3 Justice Scalia thus distinguishes between an acquittal on aggra-
vating factors and an "acquittal" of death. SattaZabn, therefore, may have an
impact far beyond its holding. Sentencing phase jury instructions and verdict
forms, at most, disclose whether the jury unanimously found an aggravating
factor beyond a reasonable doubt. The instructions and verdict forms do not
reveal whether the jury was unanimous in rejecting an aggravating factor.
Assume a case in which the jury (as disclosed by the verdict form) was
unanimous in finding an aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt, but
imposed a life sentence. The jury clearly did not "acquit" the defendant of the
aggravating factor. If the defendant successfully appeals the conviction, Justice
Scalia would apparently permit him to be retried and sentenced to death.
Assume a case in which the jury failed to find an aggravating factor unani-
mously and beyond a reasonable doubt and returned a life verdict. The verdict
form will not reveal whether the jury was unanimous in rejecting the aggravating
factor or whether it was split on that question. If the jury was split-it was a
hung jury on the existence of the aggravator-it did not "acquit" the defendant
of the aggravator. Because the verdict form will not reveal whether the jury
unanimously rejected the aggravator (an "acquittal") or whether it was split on
the existence of the aggravator (a "hung jury'), the defendant will not be able to
establish his "acquittal" of the aggravating factor and, therefore, cannot establish
his "legal entitlement to a life sentence." 4 In each of these two cases, at least
three members of the Court would find that the defendant, if he successfully
50. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(E) (Michie 2000) (providing sentencing procedures).
51. See Sattazahn, 123 S. Ct. at 742. A majority of the Supreme Court so held. Id. (plurality
opinion); id. at 743 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
52. The material from this portion of the text is from Part III of the Scalia opinion. Justice
Kennedy and Justice O'Connor did not join Part III. Thus, Justice Scalia is writing for only three
members of the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Thomas and himself. Id. at 735.
53. Id. at 740.
54. See id., at 737-38 (citing Rumsy, 467 U.S. at 211) (establishing standards for legal
entitlement to a life sentence).
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appeals his conviction, can be retried for death. Counsel representing defendants
whose juries returned life verdicts must carefully consider whether to advise their
clients to risk an appeal of the conviction.
V. Conclusion
Sattaazahn clearly permits retrial for death after a successful appeal of a case
in which a life sentence was judicially imposed after the jury could not agree on
a penalty. At least three members of the Court would permit retrial for death
after a successful appeal of a case in which the jury returned a life verdict. The
retrial for death would be permitted unless the verdict forms establish that the
jury, by unanimously rejecting all charged aggravators, "acquitted" the defendant
of those aggravators and thereby created a 'legal entitlement to a life sentence."55
Defense counsel considering an appeal after a life verdict can no longer rely on
Bull'ngton as authority for an "acquittal of death."
Priya Nath
55. Id. (citing Rumsey, 467 U.S. at 211).
2003]

